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Case No. 20470

INTRODUCTION

I

Pursuant to Rule 35(a) , U.R.A.P.f Appellant respectfully

I petitions for a rehearing of his appeal and the decision of this
Court entered on July 29, 1987. The Petition for Rehearing is
necessary andf

in the interest of justice, should be granted

because the Court's decision on the statute of limitations issues
is fundamentally
governing

erroneous

this case.

as to the critical

facts and law

In fact, as the State conceded

in its

brief, the crime, if any, was complete at the time Appellant took
the investors' monies and failed to place them in a trust account
as

promised

and, instead,

operating account.
expenditures

from

placed

them

in his own personal

Brief of Respondent at 28, n.13. Subsequent
his account

are neither

an element

of the

offense nor do they establish the date of completion

of the

crime.
Further,
limitations
YDE & PRATT
ORNEYS AT LAW
MERICAN SAVINGS
PLAZA
ST SECOND SOUTH
kLT LAKE CITY,
UTAH 84101

had

as the State
run

on

six

also
of

conceded,
the

eight

the statute of
counts

in the

information, unless certain tolling provisions not considered by
the Court in its decision are applicable.

Brief of Respondent at

29.

ARGUMENT
1. The offense, if any, was complete when Appellant
placed the investors' funds into his own operating
account rather than placing those funds in trust.
The Court's premise

for its decision on the statute of

limitations issues is that the case was submitted to the jury on
the theory of embezzlement

and, correspondingly, that the jury

i, could, therefore, consider expenditures made after Appellant took
I the investors' monies and placed them in his own account rather
I than in a trust account as he had promised.

In its opinion at

h

i| page 3 f the Court states that:
The case was presented, argued and submitted to the
jury on the theory of embezzlement,
and no
alternative or conflicting instructions were given
on the time-barred offense of theft by deception.
Defendant's contention that the jury might have
convicted on the basis of an offense neither
prosecuted nor instructed upon is not supported by
the record and is therefore without merit.
State v. Snyder, No. 20470, Slip Op. at 3 (emphasis supplied).
This statement is in direct conflict with the facts as the State
recognized
brief that:
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SAVINGS
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in its brief.

The State pointedly conceded in its

At
trial,
the
prosecutor
proceeded
on
an
embezzlement theory alleging the time of the
offense
to have occurred
when the defendant
expended
money
from
the
operating
account
containing the Temple Hills Project funds (R. 197) .
However, the case was submitted to the jury on a
straight
theft theory and the jury was not
instructed
on
embezzlement,
(See,
Jury
Instructions, R^ 143-164) .
In light of these
circumstances and the prevailing case law on the
subject, the State agrees that the time of each
offense was when defendant took the investors'
moneys, failed to place it in a trust account, and
put it in his own operating account over which he
had sole control.
State v. Gainer, 227 Kan. 670 ,
608 P.2d 968 CL980) (The crime of theft is not a
continuing offense but is complete at the time of
taking) .

:

\

I State

v,

Snyder,

i

Brief

of

Respondent

at

28f

n.13.

(emphasis

i/

supplied.)
As the State acknowledged, the time of the offense was when
Appellant took the investors' monies, failed to place them in a
i trust account andf instead, put them in his own operating account
I
2/
1

over

which

he

had

sole

control.

Based

on

these

factsf

the

statute of limitations had clearly run on at least six of the
I eight counts at the time the first information was filed.

This

J is plainly demonstrated by Appellant's chart, reproduced on page
4 of the Court's opinion, which lists the dates of investment and
T7 As the Court noted in its opinion at page 3 , the offense of
theft is complete when one appropriates property of another to
his own use without permission. In this case, that occurred, if
at allf even under an embezzlement theory when Appellant placed
the investors' monies in his operating account without their
permission.
2/ As Appellant
noted in his original brief, subsequent
expenditures from the account were not elements of the crime and
could not extend the statute for an offense which was already
complete. See Brief of Appellant at 22 and cases cited therein.
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dates

of

deposit

of

monies

into

the

Appellant's

operating

account.
As that chart showsf the statute of limitations for the
counts in the information filed on October 7, 1983f had clearly
run on counts II through V and VII and VIII.

For those counts,

Appellant had, according to the State's best theoryf
ally

and

knowingly

appropriated

the

intention-

investors'

property

to his personal use without their permission when he deposited
their

funds

into

offense, if anyf
Record at 153.

his

personal

was complete.

whether

At

See jury

that

time,

the

Instruction No. 11,

This crucial point was also expressly recognized

by the State in its brief.
The

account.

questions

various

See Brief of Respondent at 29.

raised

tolling

on

appeal

by

both

parties

provisions were applicable

were

to the six

counts on which the statute had run and whether Appellant was
unfairly prejudiced

on the two other counts.

The Court never

reached these questions because it concluded that
had been instructed

on an embezzlement

theory;

(1) the jury
(2) subsequent

expenditures, rather than unauthorized deposit of investor funds
into

Appellant's

offense;
convicted

own

and

(3)

by

the

expenditures.

accounts,

Appellant
jury

for

could,

the

therefore,

embezzlement

time
be

based

of

the

properly
on

those

Appellant respectfully submits that every one of

these conclusions is in error.
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2.
The range of dates in each count of the
information
render
the
jury
verdict
fatally
ambiguous on an essential element of the offense.
Most importantly, even under an embezzlement theory, the
jury

verdict

statute

of

would

still

be

limitations.

fatally

This

point

ambiguous
was

regarding

directly

Appellant in his brief at pages 22 through 26.

raised

the
by

In shortf six of

the counts of the information, each framed with a range of dates,
included beginning dates in 1979 for which prosecution was barred
and ending dates in 1980 for which it was not.

It is impossible

to tell on which date, if any, of these dates the jury found
Appellant committed the offenses. This argument was not pursued
in

the

Reply

Brief

or

at

oral

argument

because

the

State,

commendably, had already conceded that the statute had, in fact,
run on six of the eight counts, unless there were
3/
tolling provisions.

applicable

3.
Affirmance of a conviction on the basis of a
charge not presented to the jury offends basic
notions of due process.
The Court's decision upholding Appellant's conviction on
an embezzlement

theory violates the most basic notions of due

process because that theory was not submitted to the jury.

As

the

in

United

States

Supreme

Court

recently

held

37 With regard to the tolling provisions, it must be stressed
that the State did not plead in the information or prove at trial
any of the facts upon which it relied in its appellate brief.
This requires reversal. As this Court noted in State v. Strand,
674 P.2d 109 (1983) , any facts which allegedly toll the statute
of limitations must be pled in the information, and a defective
information which omits such facts may be amended only before
trial. Id. at 114.

Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979):
To uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither
alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at
trial offends the most basic notions of due
process.
See also, Cole v. State of Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201-202 (1948),
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that this Court
should grant the instant Petition for Rehearing.
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